DOES RETRANSMISSION CONSENT
NEED FIXING? (OR DO CONSUMERS
NEED HELP SO THEY CAN WATCH
THE SUPER BOWL, WORLD SERIES,
AND ACADEMY AWARDS?)
Gregory J. Vogt†

I.

INTRODUCTION

In today’s marketplace, television programming consumers have more
choices of providers than ever before. Customers are regularly bombarded with
advertising from satellite, cable companies, and over-builders; and many can
also choose a competitive wireline cable provider, such as Verizon or AT&T.
In addition, more and more video programming is available online, with some
customers choosing to drop all video subscription services in favor of Internet
offerings.1 However, based on market share data, consumers still prefer traditional television.2
Local broadcast affiliates of the major networks and network-owned affiliates had allowed cable providers to retransmit their feeds in exchange for carriage of other network-owned channels and similar non-monetary compensation.3 However, beginning around 2004, networks and broadcasters have used
†
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Jenna Wortham, Crowded Field for Bringing Web Video to TVs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
23, 2010, at B4.
2
NIELSEN, A LOOK ACROSS MEDIA: THE CROSS-PLATFORM REPORT Q3 2013, at 5
(2013), available at http://commcns.org/1olhwIv; see Wortham, supra note 1; see also Mark
Hughes, How Cable’s Emmy Wins Signal the Future of Television Programming, FORBES
(Sept. 23, 2013), http://commcns.org/1i891CU (commenting on the success of television
programs at the Emmy Awards).
3
Matthew A. Brill & Matthew T. Murchison, How the FCC Can Protect Consumers in
the Battle Over Retransmissions Consent, BLOOMBERG LAW, http://commcns.org/OUraax
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the entry of new competitors into the video programming market and their leverage as providers of critical programming to demand increasing monetary
compensation from cable and satellite providers.4 Battles over the appropriate
level of compensation for network programming have led to several “blackouts,” in which the broadcaster withholds permission for retransmission of its
signal during negotiations.5 For example, Time Warner Cable’s viewers in a
number of markets could not view CBS programming for at least a month in
2013, and Cablevision’s New York viewers were unable to see the first two
games of the 2010 World Series due to a transmission dispute between Cablevision and Fox.6 These blackouts have raised the ire of consumers, causing
concern both in Congress and at the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC” or “Commission”).7
While broadcasters argue that the majority of retransmission consent agreements are resolved without blackouts and that the retransmission consent regime is working,8 multi-channel video programming distributors (“MVPDs”),
such as incumbent and competitive cable companies and satellite providers,
claim that it is these increasing retransmission consent fees that are causing

(last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
4
See In re Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 F.C.C.R. 2718, 2719 (Mar. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Time
Warner et al., Petition] (“Today . . . many consumers have additional options for receiving
programming . . . One result of such changes in the marketplace is that disputes over retransmission consent have become more contentious and more public, and we recently have
seen a rise in negotiation impasses that have affected millions of consumers.”); see also
Philip M. Napoli, Retransmission Consent and Broadcaster Commitment to Localism, 20
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 345, 345 (2012).
5
See Napoli, supra note 4, at 349 (“Of particular importance has been the increased
frequency of actual or threatened broadcast station blackouts and the publicity surrounding
these high-stakes negotiations. While there were 31 actual or publicly threatened broadcast
blackout events between 2000 and 2009, there were 5 additional blackout events in 2010
alone, affecting 19 million viewers.”).
6
Bill Carter, CBS Returns, Triumphant, to Cable Box, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2013, at A1
(discussing the month long dispute between Time Warner and CBS); see Time Warner et
al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2726–27; see also Brian Stelter, For World Series, Cablevision
Steers Customers Online, N.Y. TIMES, http://commcns.org/1i898hL (last updated Oct. 27,
2010, 8:02 PM) (“The first game of the [2010] World Series was blacked out in three million homes serviced by Cablevision on Wednesday night, because of a continuing dispute
between the cable company and Fox, which is broadcasting the championship series.”).
7
See Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2726–27; see also Ted Johnson,
CBS-Time Warner Cable Blackout Spurs D.C. Action on Retrans, VARIETY (Sept. 12, 2013),
http://commcns.org/1hH85SR.
8
In re Amendment of Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission, Comments of
National Association of Broadcasters, MB Docket No. 10-71, at 3, 7–8 (May 27, 2011),
available at http://commcns.org/NoQDrC. The National Association of Broadcasters claims
that “it is extremely rare for retransmission consent negotiations to result in disruptions to
consumers’ viewing as a result of an impasse between a broadcaster and a MVPD.” Id. at 7.
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consumers to suffer loses of programming and increased costs.9 Further complicating matters is increased network demands that local affiliates rebate a
portion of retransmission fees back to the network, and efforts by at least one
network to offer the network feed to an MVPD directly if the MVPD is unable
to come to agreement with the local affiliate.10
A number of the major MVPDs have succeeded in convincing the FCC to
initiate a rulemaking to revise the retransmission consent process, although the
FCC’s authority in this area is limited by statute.11 Based on the conditions the
Commission included in its approval of the Comcast/NBC merger, it is possible that the Commission might pressure broadcasters by allowing MVPDs to
continue offering the broadcast programming during a negotiation impasse and
by requiring binding arbitration.12 However, the FCC has concluded that it does
not have the statutory authority to require these measures and instead sought
comment on less stringent means to encourage retransmission agreements and
avoid programming blackouts.13
Currently, the competition amongst programmers for viewership is increasing, the nature and delivery methods for programming are changing, and many
programmers are making inroads against more traditional network TV shows.14
Cable-delivered news programming has proliferated, although it provides a
level of news coverage different from local news programming or over-the-air
broadcasters.15 Notwithstanding these changes, however, many viewers still
want access to local broadcasts for news and network programming,16 and
9
In re Amendment of Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission, Comments of
AT&T, MB Docket No. 10-71, at 9–10 (May 27, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/MJAWua.
10 See supra notes 59–62.
11 See Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2720–21, 2725. The Commission
noted that in “March 2010, 14 MVPDs and public interest groups filed a rulemaking petition
arguing that the Commission’s retransmission consent regulations are outdated and are
harming consumers.” Id. at 2725.
12 In re Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric Company, and NBC
Universal, Inc. for Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 26 F.C.C.R. 4238, 4309, 4353, 4358, 4363–64 (Jan. 20, 2011)
[hereinafter Comcast et al., Applications] (approving Comcast’s purchase of NBCUniversal). Under Part II of Appendix A, the FCC required that retransmission consent be
subject to commercial arbitration. Id. at 4358. At Part IV.G of Appendix A, the FCC lists
the prohibited unfair practices. Id. at 4363–64.
13 Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2720 & n.6.
14 See Hughes, supra note 2.
15 Hyuhn-Suhck Bae, Product Differentiation in National TV Newscasts: A Comparison
of the Cable All-News Networks and the Broadcast Networks, 44 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA
62, 65 (2000) (observing that, for example, “CNN’s reporting was of less depth compared to
network reporting,” and CNN reported on “a somewhat greater number of international
stories”).
16 See Napoli, supra note 4, at 350–51 (noting that local broadcasting is important to
citizens during natural disasters and that localism drives the communications policy in the
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many new MVPDs believe carriage of local broadcasters is an essential part of
their channel line-ups.17
The reality is that the number of retransmission disputes is growing.18 This
trend is likely to continue with increased competition among MVPDs and
mounting involvement by networks in local affiliate retransmission negotiations. The question is whether there is a need for a total reworking of retransmission consent law, or is the real competitive need for more limited relief, for
example, on behalf of new entrant MVPDs that arguably lack the ability to
negotiate favorable carriage agreements with more established over-the-air
broadcasters. While the FCC’s proposals, if adopted, may have some effect on
retransmission negotiations, the Commission’s authority is limited by statute
and any meaningful change will need to be made by Congress.19
Section II of this article describes the origins of retransmission consent and
must carry laws and regulations. Section III outlines the retransmission consent
negotiation requirement of the 1992 Cable Act. Section IV highlights the current retransmission consent negotiations environment. Section V describes the
current consumer anger and reactions of government officials to that anger.
Section VI describes the FCC’s recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which
proposes possible changes to the retransmission consent regulations. Finally,
Section VII analyzes possible changes to the current negotiations environment
United States).
17 Brill & Murchison, supra note 3.
18 Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2719 (“disputes over retransmission
consent have become more contentious and more public, and we recently have seen a rise in
negotiation impasses that have affected millions of consumers”); see also Brill & Murchison, supra note 3 (“[I]n recent years, the demands for greater cash payments have made
retransmission consent negotiations between broadcast stations and MVPDs increasingly
contentious.”).
19 Bryan N. Tramont, Too Much Power, Too Little Restraint: How the FCC Expands Its
Reach Through Unenforceable and Unwieldy “Voluntary” Agreements, 53 FED. COMM. L.J.
49, 51–52 (2000). As Tramont explains:
The Commission’s ability to exploit its power to achieve policies outside its
mandate depends on the agency’s ability to escape judicial and, to a lesser degree, congressional review. In theory, a number of forces should constrain the
FCC’s authority. Most fundamentally, the Act, like other delegations of congressional authority, delineates the scope of the Commission’s authority over the
communications marketplace. Essential to this statutory scheme is the ability of
aggrieved parties to obtain judicial review of the FCC’s actions. Through judicial review, the courts limit the Commission’s discretion to act by enforcing legislative limitations and holding the FCC to standards of reasoned decision[]making and constitutional norms. Beyond the limits imposed by the Act and the
courts, Congress impacts the FCC’s authority through appropriations and oversight. Theoretically, these constraints require the Commission to stay within its
regulatory and jurisdictional boundaries and to engage in reasoned and publicly
documented decision-making procedures.
Id. (citations omitted).
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given modern market realities.
II.

EVOLUTION OF THE CURRENT RETRANSMISSION
CONSENT AND MUST-CARRY REGIME

Cable television originated in the late 1940s as a retransmission service for
areas that did not receive a high quality signal from broadcast television stations using standard antennas.20 Cable television did not initially compete with
broadcasters, but rather expanded the audience broadcast stations were able to
reach.21 Consequently, in 1958 the FCC declined to regulate cable television,
stating that cable television was not a common carrier or a broadcaster under
the Communications Act of 1934.22 The FCC reaffirmed this interpretation in
1959.23
As cable operators began adding “distant” signals to their offerings, cable
television became more valuable to consumers and a potential threat to local
broadcasters.24 In response to these developments, in 1963, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a Commission decision refusing to
grant a microwave license to a cable operator unless the cable operator agreed
to carry the signal of the local broadcast station.25 These rules were later extended, requiring cable systems to transmit to their subscribers the signals of
any station into whose service area they have brought competing signals (mustcarry)26 and prohibiting the import of distant signals into the 100 largest televi20 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 627 (1994) (“The earliest cable
systems were built in the late 1940’s [sic] to bring clear broadcast television signals to remote or mountainous communities.”); see Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission
Consent: An Examination of the Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. § 325(b)) of
the 1992 Cable Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 104–05 (1996); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Who We Are: Our Story, NCTA, available at http://commcns.org/1i0jEDu
(last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (providing a useful graph, which depicts the history of cable).
21 See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 627 (noting that, initially, cable systems’ purpose
“was not to replace broadcast television but to enhance it”).
22 Frontier Broadcast Co. v. J.E. Collier, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24 F.C.C.
251, 253–54 (Apr. 2, 1958).
23 In re Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV
“Satellite” Stations, and TV “Repeaters” on the Orderly Development of Television Broadcasting, Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427–28 (Apr. 13, 1959).
24 Lubinsky, supra note 20, at 105.
25 Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. F.C.C., 321 F.2d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
26 In re Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, to Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern
the Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay
Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems; and Amendment of Subpart I, Part 21,
to Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Domestic
Public Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Service for Microwave Stations Used to Relay Television Broadcast Signals to Community Antenna Television Systems, First Report and
Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 716–19 (Apr. 22, 1965) (applying rules to all cable providers using
microwave relay systems). In 1966, the requirement was expanded to all cable systems. See
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sion markets without FCC approval.27 These rules were upheld by the Supreme
Court in 1968.28 In 1972, the FCC added a program exclusivity requirement,
which gave local television stations that had purchased exclusive exhibition
rights and copyright holders the ability to demand that the local cable systems
delete a program from retransmitted distant signals.29 However, in Quincy Cable TV, Inc., the D.C. Circuit held that the FCC’s must-carry regulations violated cable operators’ First Amendment rights.30 Subsequently, the FCC attempted to make the rules consistent with the Quincy Cable decision, but the
D.C. Circuit again struck them down as a violation of the First Amendment.31
In addition to reviewing FCC regulation, the courts were also addressing
copyright questions raised by broadcast retransmission over cable systems. In
response to two Supreme Court decisions, finding that the retransmission of
broadcast programming did not implicate copyright issues,32 Congress revised
In re Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the
Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay
Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems; Amendment of Subpart I, Part 21, to
Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Domestic Public
Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Service for Microwave Stations Used to Relay Television
Broadcast Signals to Community Antenna Television Systems; Amendment of Parts 21, 74,
and 91 to Adopt Rules and Regulations Relating to the Distribution of Television Broadcast
Signals by Community Antenna Television Systems, and Related Matters, Second Report
and Order, 2 F.C.C. 2d 725, 746 (Mar. 4, 1966) [hereinafter CATV Second Report and Order] (“To insure effective integration of CATV with a fully developed television service, the
new regulations will apply equally to all CATV systems, including those which require
microwave licenses and those which receive their signals off the air . . . The microwave
rules will be revised to reflect the new rules adopted for all systems.”).
27 CATV Second Report and Order, supra note 26, at 782.
28 In United States v. Southwestern Cable, the Court upheld the Commission’s authority
to prohibit a cable operator’s ability to import the distant signal of a local television stations
from another local market. United States v. Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. 157, 175, 178, 181 (1968).
It also affirmed the Commission’s ancillary authority to regulate cable operators in aid of its
authority to regulate television broadcasting. Id. at 178.
29 In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations
Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems; and Inquiry into the Development of
Communications Technology and Services to Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking
and/or Legislative Proposals; Amendment of Section 74.1107 of the Commission’s Rules
and Regulations to Avoid Filing of Repetitious Requests; Amendment of Section 74.1031(c)
and 74.1105(a) and (b) of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations As They Relate to Addition of New Television Signals; Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission’s
Rules and Regulations Relative to Federal-State or Local Relationships in the Community
Antenna Television System Field; and/or Formulation of Legislative Proposals in This Respect; Amendment of Subpart K of Part 74 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations with
Respect to Technical Standards for Community Antenna Television Systems, Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143, 165 (Feb. 3, 1972).
30 Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 768 F.2d 1434, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
31 Century Commc’ns Corp. v. F.C.C., 835 F.2d 292, 297, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
32 Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 412 (1974) (hearing
a claim by holders of copyrighted television programs, which alleged copyright infringe-
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the Copyright Act to establish a compulsory licensing scheme.33 These changes
required cable operators to compensate copyright owners for retransmitted
programming based on a government-set formula, but did not require payment
to broadcasters for retransmission of local or distant signals.34 After these
changes to the Copyright Act, the idea of retransmission consent was proposed
to the FCC by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (“NTIA”),35 but no such scheme was adopted.
The retransmission and must-carry laws in place today were passed as part
of the 1992 Cable Act.36 Congress sought to address a number of issues, including consumer complaints regarding rising cable rates and poor service
quality.37 The Act re-regulated basic tier cable rates38—which had been deregulated in 198439—and the Act also eliminated exclusive cable franchises40 and
increased consumer protections.41 In addition, while leaving the copyright
payment scheme intact, Congress added retransmission consent requirements
and must-carry provisions.42 The retransmission provision prohibits a cable
system or other MVPD from retransmitting the signal of a broadcasting station,
unless it receives the express authority of the originating station or pursuant to
the must-carry provisions, if a station elects to be subject to them.43 Thus, if a
ment through the broadcasting of television programs by CATV systems); Fortnightly Corp.
v. United Artists Television Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395, 402 (1968) (deciding whether CATV
systems performed the copyrighted works).
33 Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–801 (2006)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 88–89
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5703 (stating that the compulsory copyright
was adopted in response to Supreme Court precedent).
34 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2012) (providing an exemption for retransmissions within the
station’s local service area).
35 Lubinsky, supra note 20, at 112.
36 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); see 47
U.S.C. §534 (2006) (requiring must carry); see also 47 U.S.C. § 325 (2006) (retransmission
consent).
37 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 §§ 3, 8, 106
Stat. 1460, 1464–71, 1484 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 543, 552) (regulating rates and service
quality).
38 Id. § 3, 106 Stat. 1460, 1464 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2)).
39 Thomas W. Hazlett, Cable Television Rate Deregulation, 3 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 145,
145, 150 (1996).
40 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 7, 106 Stat.
1460, 1483 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)).
41 Id. §§ 8, 19–20, 106 Stat. 1460, 1484, 1494, 1497 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 551–52)
(regulating service quality and privacy).
42 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (2006). If the station elects must carry status pursuant to section
534, then no retransmission consent fees are owed. See id. § 534. Further, section 535 requires cable operators to carry the signals of qualified, noncommercial educational television stations. Id. § 535(a).
43 Id. § 325(b)(1).
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broadcaster selects must carry, it is guaranteed carriage on cable systems operating within its broadcast footprint, but will receive no compensation.44 If a
broadcaster chooses retransmission consent, it is not guaranteed carriage, but
can negotiate “in good faith” for compensation.45 Broadcasters were required to
choose between retransmission consent and must-carry within one year of §
325’s enactment and every three years thereafter.46
The Act also required the FCC to establish rules to implement these provisions.47 In 1993, the FCC determined that retransmission consent applies to
both distant and local signals, but only local broadcasters have the option of
selecting must carry.48 In addition, the Commission concluded that a broadcaster’s failure to choose either must-carry or retransmission consent by the applicable deadline would result in must-carry status for the broadcaster; the broadcaster would then need to bargain over the rights to the signal, rather than the
rights in the individual programming.49 However, the FCC’s authority to require retransmission consent agreements is limited because the only restriction
on broadcasters is that they negotiate in good faith.50
The impetus for the retransmission consent and must-carry provisions was
to protect broadcasters and strengthen their position vis-à-vis the growing popularity (and power) of cable television.51 The Conference Committee Report for
the Act does not provide much information regarding the inclusion of the retransmission consent and must-carry provisions; however, the provisions
evolved from a report by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.52 The Senate Committee’s report stated:
Cable systems now include not only local signals, but also distant broadcast
44 Rob Frieden, Analog and Digital Must-Carry Obligations of Cable and Satellite Television Operators in the United States, 15 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 230, 231, 234 & n.9 (2006).
45 Id. at 241 n.31.
46 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(B).
47 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 6, 106 Stat.
1460, 1482–1483 (codified at 47 U.S.C. 325(b)(3)).
48 In re Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 2965, 2972–74 (Mar. 29, 1993); Thomas W.
Hazlett, Digitizing “Must-Carry” Under Turner Broadcasting v. FCC (1997), 8 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 141, 143 (2000) (“Must-carry rules require cable systems to carry local broadcast signals without charge.”).
49 In re Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, supra note 48, at 3002. The Commission believed that making “must-carry the
default category” would incentivize stations to grant the “express authority” needed by cable
operators to acquire access to the signals for the operators’ subscribers. Id.
50 AM. TELEVISION ALLIANCE, UNTIL THE RETRANS RULES CHANGE, THE SKY’S THE LIMIT ON BROADCASTER BLACKOUTS, AMERICAN TELEVISION ALLIANCE 6, available at
http://commcns.org/1jN2hru (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
51 Former Rep. Jack Fields, Fix Broken Broadcast Retransmission Consent System,
HILL (Nov. 15, 2010, 11:53 AM), http://commcns.org/1coV0OY.
52 Lubinsky, supra note 20, at 119.

116

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 22

signals and the programming of cable networks and premium services. . . . Due
to the FCC’s interpretation of section 325, however, cable systems use these
signals without having to seek the permission of the originating broadcaster or
having to compensate the broadcaster for the value its product creates for the
cable operator.53
The Report further explained that this created a “distortion in the video marketplace which threatens the future of over-the-air broadcasting”54 and “the
intent of [the retransmission consent provision] is to ensure that our system of
free broadcasting remain [sic] vibrant, and not be replaced by a system which
requires consumers to pay for television service.”55 The Committee intended
“to establish a marketplace for the disposition of the rights to retransmit broadcast signals” but did not intend “to dictate the outcome of the ensuing marketplace negotiations.”56
III.

RETRANSMISSION NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE 1992
CABLE ACT

Although broadcasters tried to use the new Act to seek monetary compensation in return for retransmission consent, cable operators strongly resisted this
and instead offered “to compensate broadcasters with advertising time, crosspromotions, and carriage of affiliated channels.”57 As the FCC noted:
[By 2005], cash still has not emerged as a principal form of consideration
for retransmission consent. Today, virtually all retransmission consent agreements involve a cable operator providing in-kind consideration to the broadcaster.58
However, despite the fact that broadcasters were generally not able to negotiate cash compensation,59 the FCC still found that:
Must-carry alone would fail to provide stations with the opportunity to be
compensated for their popular programming. Retransmission consent alone
would not preserve local stations that have a smaller audience yet still offer
free over-the-air programming and serve the public in their local areas.60
In 2000, the FCC adopted rules governing what constituted “good-faith” neS. Rep. No. 102-92, at 35 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1168.
Id., 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1168.
55 Id. at 36, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1169.
56 Id., 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1169.
57 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, RETRANSMISSION CONSENT AND EXCLUSIVITY RULES: REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 208 OF THE SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION
AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2004, at 6 (2005), available at http://commcns.org/1lvhC35.
58 Id. at 6–7.
59 Id. at 6.
60 Id. at 18.
53
54
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gotiations between cable providers and direct satellite providers61 (together
“MVPDs”) and broadcasters.62 These rules require that broadcasters negotiate
with MVPDs in good faith, while making an exception for retransmission consents—proposed or entered into—containing different terms, so long as such
terms are based “competitive marketplace considerations.”63 Other rules regarding the conduct of negotiations were adopted at the same time.64 These
rules were originally set to terminate in 2006, but have been extended.65
At the time this report was published, the relative bargaining position of
broadcasters began to increase vis-à-vis with that of MVPDs. Broadcasters
were first able to negotiate monetary compensation from MVPDs beginning in
2005.66 Cable providers, who long had a monopoly position, were now competing with direct broadcast satellite providers and telephone companies entering
the video market, and broadcasters were beginning to explore additional outlets
for their programming using the Internet.67 Because the satellite providers and
telephone companies were new entrants in the market, their smaller customer
bases afforded them less market power from which to resist broadcaster demands for monetary compensation. As these competitors to cable increased
their market share, broadcasters were able to increase pressure on the cable

61 Note that satellite providers are governed by separate but similar retransmission consent and must-carry requirements. Compare 47 C.F.R. § 76.65 (2012) (regulating television
broadcast stations and MVPDs), with id. § 76.66 (governing satellite broadcast signal carriage).
62 In re Implementation of the Satellite Home View Improvement Act of 1999; Retransmission Consent Issues: Good Faith Negotiation and Exclusivity, First Report and
Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 5445, 5446 (Mar. 16, 2000). The good faith requirement was extended
to all MVPDs in 2004. See generally Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-477, 118 Stat. 3393 (2004).
63 47 C.F.R. § 76.65.
64 A broadcaster must not: (1) refuse to negotiate retransmission consent with any multichannel video programming distributor; (2) refuse to designate a representative with authority make binding representations on retransmission consent; (3) refuse to meet and negotiate retransmission consent at reasonable times and locations; (4) refuse to put forth more
than a single, unilateral proposal; (5) fail respond to a retransmission consent proposal of an
MVPD; (6) enter into an agreement which requires a broadcast station to refrain from granting retransmission consent to any MVPD; and (7) refusing to execute a written retransmission consent agreement with an MVPD. Id. § 76.65(b)(1).
65 In re Implementation of the Satellite Home View Improvement Act of 1999, Retransmission Consent Issues: Good Faith Negotiation and Exclusivity, supra note 62, at
5448 (“The Commission’s rules regarding exclusive retransmission consent agreements
sunset on January 1, 2006.”); 47 C.F.R. § 76.65(f) (extending the rules to February 28,
2010).
66 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
of Video Programming, Twelfth Annual Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 2501, 2584 (Mar. 3, 2006).
67 Id. at 2511–69 (discussing the marketplace competition for video programming); see
Katy Bachman, FCC Set to Decide on Program Access Rule: Could Change Lineups on
Cable, ADWEEK (Aug. 31, 2012), http://commcns.org/1hH8zZd.
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companies to make similar deals.68
Broadcasters had a few additional advantages that further strengthened their
bargaining position. In addition to increased leverage from MVPD competitors, broadcasters had the protection of the network non-duplication rule,
which allows a television broadcast station that has purchased exclusive rights
to network programming within a specified area to demand that a local cable
system’s duplicate carriage of the same program be blacked out.69 A similar
protection existed with the syndicated program exclusivity rule, but it applies
to exclusive contracts for syndicated programming, rather than for network
programming.70 These twin protections gave broadcasters exclusive geographic
rights in showing programming to their customers, which allowed them to leverage their customer preferences into money exacted from their cable competitors. Finally, despite the increasingly broad array of non-broadcast programming that are available to cable operators, the broadcast television station signals are still regarded as “must have” programming.71
The FCC recognized this broadcaster power over these various types of programming when reviewing the News Corp. and DIRECTV transaction.72 The
Commission described local broadcast stations as “without close substitutes”73
and noted that News Corp. “possesses significant market power in the [Designated Market Areas] in which it has the ability to negotiate retransmission consent agreements on behalf of local broadcast television stations.”74
Despite this increased broadcaster power, the FCC had done little to help
cable operators and other MVPDs protect themselves against payment of higher and higher fees in retransmission consent disputes. In general, the FCC has
filed few complaints filed regarding the good-faith negotiation requirement.
Therefore, there was little precedent regarding what constitutes “good faith.”75
Indeed, the FCC has explicitly recognized that even good faith negotiations
may not result in an agreement.76
Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2726 n.48, 2738.
47 C.F.R. § 76.92(a).
70 Id. § 76.101. Syndicated programming is broadcast by local broadcast stations that
enter into their own arrangements with programmers, such as Jeopardy or Wheel of Fortune,
whereas network programming is marketed by TV networks, such as ABC or Fox, for airing
through local affiliation agreements.
71 In re General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors,
and The News Corporation Limited, Transferee, for Authority to Transfer Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 473, 477 (Jan. 14, 2004).
72 Id. at 476–77.
73 Id. at 565.
74 Id.
75 Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2724.
76 In re Mediacom Communications Corporation v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc.
Emergency Retransmission Consent Complaint and Complaint for Enforcement for Failure
to Negotiate Retransmission Consent Rights in Good Faith, Memorandum Opinion and
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With critically important, popular programming, multiple MVPDs in each
market, and the non-duplication and syndicated program exclusivity rules, the
power of the broadcasters to demand substantial monetary compensation from
MVPDs has continued to increase.
IV.

CURRENT RETRANSMISSION CONSENT NEGOTIATION
ENVIRONMENT

Expirations of retransmission consent agreements are now loud, public affairs punctuated by ad campaigns by the relevant MVPD and broadcast station,
each blaming the other for any impasse in negotiations and the possibility of a
blackout, in which the broadcaster will withdraw its programming from the
MVPD.77 For example, the March 2010 Academy Awards broadcast was
marred for about 3 million viewers in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut
because ABC’s New York affiliate required Cablevision, the incumbent cable
operator, to block out its signal because of a retransmission consent dispute.78
The signal was restored thirteen minutes into the Awards ceremony.79 During
the dispute Cablevision said that Disney, the owner of ABC, was putting its
“own financial interests above their viewers,” while Disney criticized “Cablevision’s legendary greed and disregard for the needs of their customers.”80
In October 2010, Cablevision viewers endured a two-week blackout of
Fox’s local affiliate, which prevented Cablevision customers from watching a
significant part of the Major League Baseball playoffs.81 The parties settled
their dispute prior to the beginning of the World Series, with Cablevision stating, “In the absence of any meaningful action from the FCC, Cablevision has
agreed to pay Fox an unfair price for multiple channels of its programming
including many in which our customers have little or no interest.”82 A further
interesting feature of the Cablevision/Fox dispute was that Fox blocked Cablevision’s Internet subscribers from accessing Fox shows on Hulu.com, ex-

Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 35, 45 (Jan. 4, 2007).
77 See Roger Yu, CBS, Time Warner Cable Reach Deal, End Blackout: Programming
Resumed Monday for More Than 3 Million Customers, USA TODAY, Sept. 3, 2013, at A4
(discussing the Time Warner Cable and CBS dispute).
78 Barry Paddock & Richard Huff, ABC-Cablevision Blackout Lifted Just after Oscars
Begin
As
Two
Companies
Reach
Agreement,
NYDAILYNEWS.COM,
http://commcns.org/1gNLl1u (last updated Mar. 7, 2010, 10:19 PM).
79 Id.
80 Sam Schechner & Ethan Smith, Cablevision, Disney End Dispute, WALL. ST. J. (Mar.
8, 2010), http://commcns.org/NOiOjy (internal quotation marks omitted).
81 Tom McElroy, Fox, Cablevision Reach Deal to End NY Blackout, HUFF POST (Oct.
31, 2010), http://commcns.org/1hH8Paq.
82 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tending retransmission consent issues to the Internet.83
In January 2011, Time Warner and Sinclair Broadcast Group came to an
agreement that prevented the blacking out of certain ABC, Fox, and CBS stations throughout the country.84 Time Warner was forced to blackout CBS stations in a number of major markets for a month in August 2013, and included a
blackout of online CBS video content.85 This last blackout ended as the NFL
season quickly approached.86
MVPDs blame broadcasters’ demands for higher retransmission-consent
fees for the increased cable rates87 levied on consumers and the recurring losses
of programming for consumers.88 Conversely, broadcasters argue that most
retransmission consent agreements are resolved without blackouts, that there is
no evidence showing a relationship between increased retransmission consent
fees and increased cable rates, and that reducing retransmission consent fees
would harm both the quality and quantity of broadcast television.89
Network involvement in retransmission consent is also increasing the likelihood of disputes. The networks have begun pressuring local affiliates for increasing shares of retransmission consent fees.90 Fox has been particularly aggressive, threatening to terminate the network affiliation if a local station does
not agree to share retransmission fees and even demanding that the local station pay the network itself if the local station cannot negotiate sufficient retransmission fees.91 Although NBC, CBS, and ABC are also looking for contributions from their local affiliates, they do not appear to be threatening to ter83 Cecilia Kang, Fox to Restore Internet Videos to Cablevision Customers, WASH. POST
(Oct. 16, 2010, 5:55 PM), http://commcns.org/MJBzUD.
84 David Goetzl, Fox, Sinclair Extend Carriage Agreement, MEDIADAILYNEWS (Jan. 12,
2011), http://commcns.org/1pX48hk; see Rob Golum & Sylvia Wier, Sinclair, Time Warner
Reach
Agreement
in
Fee
Dispute,
BLOOMBERG
(Jan.
15,
2011),
http://commcns.org/1dipDUi.
85 Brendan Bordelon, Time Warner Subscribers Ensure CBS Blackout As NFL Season
Looms, DAILY CALLER (Aug. 21, 2013), http://commcns.org/1fD1LNG.
86 Yu, supra note 77, at A4.
87 Cable rates have increased at a rate that exceeds inflation, although the price per
channel increased at a lower rate than inflation. In re Implementation of Section 3 of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992; Statistical Report on
Average Rates or Basic Service, Cable Programming Service, and Equipment, Report on
Cable Industry Prices, 28 F.C.C.R. 9857, 9859 (June 7, 2013).
88 Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2726; see Brill & Murchison, supra note
3 (describing the increasing frequency of disputes which end in blackouts).
89 Letter from Erin L. Dozier, Assoc. Gen. Counsel of Legal & Regulatory Affairs,
Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n 3 (May
6, 2010). The National Association of Broadcasters argues that consumers are twenty times
more likely to lose television during an electricity outage than during a bargaining impasse
between broadcasters and MVPDs. Id.
90 See Joe Flint, Fox Seeks a Share of Retransmission Fees; the Network Wants Some of
the Money Affiliates Get from Cable Operators, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, at B3.
91 Id.
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minate station affiliations.92 In addition, the Time Warner and Sinclair negotiations, mentioned above, revealed that Time Warner and Fox had entered into
an agreement which allowed Time Warner to purchase Fox programming if the
cable operator loses its rights to carry the signals of a Fox affiliate.93 Carrying
the network feed rather than the affiliate feed deprives the MVPD of local
news and programming, but allows the MVPD to continue showing the network’s “must-see” offerings.94 This type of side agreement allows the network
to profit directly from the MVPD but reduces the local affiliates’ leverage visà-vis the MVPD, which in turn decreases any retransmission consent fees that
can be shared with the network.95
Blackouts, due to impasses over retransmission consent negotiations, continue to this day.96 Former Chairman Julius Genachowski has publicly stated
that it may be time to address these blackouts, but he indicated that Congress
probably has to act to give the FCC authority to prevent them.97
V.

CONSUMER ANGER AND GOVERNMENT REACTION

Consumer complaints regarding these high profile blackouts and loss-ofprogramming threats have attracted attention from both Congress and the
FCC.98 Government officials describe consumers as innocent bystanders injured by fights between greedy corporations.99 For example, discussing the Fox
92

Id.
Joe Flint, Fights Between Programmers and Distributors Heat Up As 2011 Nears,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2010), http://commcns.org/1c2z6AC.
94 Use of this option by an MVPD could implicate the local affiliates’ non-duplication
rights. However, some broadcasters have not been diligent about protecting these rights,
opening an opportunity for negotiations between the network and the MVPD. Additionally,
if the network only offers the network feed and includes no local programming, the action is
unlikely to conflict with the FCC’s network non-duplication rules. See Joe Flint, Fox Clause
Is Focal Point of Fight Between Time Warner Cable and Sinclair Broadcast Group, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2010), http://commcns.org/1g5rUj6.
95 See id.
96 See, e.g., Michael Malone, Grant Communications Stations Remain Dark for Dish
Subs, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Feb. 20, 2013), http://commcns.org/1eNXTYB; Lydia Grimes,
Lost Channel Sparks Blame Game, ATMORE ADVANCE (Sept. 7, 2011),
http://commcns.org/1g5s1es.
97 Genachowski: May Be Time to Update Retrans Rules to Limit Blackouts, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Mar. 20, 2013), http://commcns.org/1gNLEJu (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
98 See id.; see also Letter from Senator John Kerry to Chase Carey, President & COO,
News Corp., and Glenn Britt, Chairman & CEO, Time Warner Cable (Dec. 22, 2009),
available at http://commcns.org/1diqjJi.
99 Television Viewers, Retransmission Consent, and the Public Interest: Hearing Before
the S. Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transp., 111th Cong. 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearing on Retransmission Consent] (statement of Sen. John F. Kerry) (describing the feelings of consumers
and business owners).
93
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and Time Warner dispute, former Senator John Kerry stated that a programming blackout would “neglect[] the core interests of the millions of households
that subscribe to Time Warner Cable in affected markets.”100 Congressmen and
public interest groups have strongly condemned Fox’s decision to limit Internet access to its online programming.101
In October 2010, Senator Kerry introduced legislation that would have restricted broadcasters’ authority to pull their signal during a negotiation impasse
and that would have also given the FCC increased authority.102 Although hearings were held by the Senate Communications Subcommittee regarding this
proposed legislation, no further action was taken.103
A further opportunity for congressional action is in the possible extension of
the distant signal provisions in the Communications Act’s satellite television
provisions, where the retransmission consent laws and the good faith negotiation requirements are contained.104 MVPDs have been hard at work lobbying
members of Congress to modify retransmission consent requirements, and
broadcasters have been insisting that no changes be made. The Subcommittee
on Communications and Technology in the House of Representatives has specifically recognized that the law of retransmission consent may need to be revised in the process of reauthorizing the distant signal provisions.105 It is doubtful that anything significant will change in this Congress concerning retransmission consent given that significant lobbying interests are at polar opposites
from each other. Nevertheless, the budget and reauthorization process bears
watching for its potential to include new retransmission consent legislation.
VI.

FCC NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING

During this same timeframe, the FCC has continued to face substantial pressure to take action to prevent, or at least mitigate, future programming blackouts.106 In March 2010, several MVPDs, both cable and satellite providers, and
Letter from Senator John Kerry to Chase Carey, supra note 98.
Brian Stelter, In Brief Blackout, Web Becomes a Weapon in Fox-Cablevision War,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, at B3.
102 See John Eggerton, Kerry Outlines Retrans Bill to FCC, BROADCASTING & CABLE
(Oct. 19, 2010), http://commcns.org/OUt2A6.
103 Subcommittee Hearing on Retransmission Consent, supra note 99.
104 See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (2006).
105 Memorandum from Majority Comm. Staff of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce to
Members & Staff of the Subcomm. on Commc’ns & Tech., at 3–4 (Jun. 10, 2013), available
at http://commcns.org/1pX5etb; see Fields, supra note 51; see also John Eggerton, Rep.
Eshoo Proposes Retransmission Consent Bill, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://commcns.org/NoSn44 (summarizing a draft bill that would make some changes to
retransmission consent laws).
106 See FCC May Look into Banning Future Chanel Blackouts, LONG ISLAND NEWSDAY,
http://commcns.org/1n3KiOO (last updated Mar. 12, 2010, 9:13 PM).
100
101
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several public interest groups filed a petition for rulemaking requesting that the
FCC modify the retransmission consent process to prevent future programming
blackouts and MVPD rate hikes caused by excessive retransmission consent
fees paid to broadcasters.107 This petition has generated over 250 comments and
ex parte notices, according to the FCC’s records.108 In December of that year,
FCC Media Bureau Chief William Lake stated that the FCC initiated a rulemaking to examine retransmission consent practices in an effort to ensure that
these fees are set by market forces while also protecting the interests of consumers.109 In describing the effect of programming blackouts on consumers,
Lake quoted an African proverb that “when the elephants fight, it is the grass
that suffers.”110 Although the FCC’s authority to regulate retransmission consent is limited, the agency can consider regulations regarding the definition of
“good faith” negotiations as well as other rules, such as the network nonduplication requirements, that give broadcasters leverage in negotiations. As
Lake explained:
One thing we’ve heard is that uncertainty exists about what good faith
means. Our
rules provide some limited guidance on this; but, if we can provide greater certainty to
the marketplace, that could help to guide the negotiating parties and reduce the number of failed deals and dropped signals. We may try to identify additional practices
that will be treated as per se violations of the duty to bargain in good faith. We may
be able to provide more specifics about the meaning and scope of the “totality of the
circumstances” test. Because a principal concern is to protect consumers when talks
break down, we may propose to strengthen our notice requirement and extend it to
non-cable distributors and broadcasters. If some of our broadcast rules are thought to
interfere with market negotiations, we may want to look at those rules.111

An indication of what the FCC might want to do (without consideration of
any statutory authority limitations) can be found in the conditions attached to
the merger of Comcast and NBC.112 The FCC frequently uses merger applications to obtain “voluntary” agreements from parties to ensure that they comply
with certain requirements for which the FCC lacks the statutory authority to
regulate.113 One of the conditions attached to the Comcast-NBC transaction
required that NBC affiliates owned by the combined Comcast/NBC entity
submit to a baseball-style arbitration process during which time Comcast and
NBC must continue to provide the programming at issue in the event of a dis-

Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2725.
See generally Electronic Comment Filing System: Proceeding 10-71, FCC.GOV,
http://commcns.org/1hH9SY3 (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
109 See Remarks of William T. Lake, Chief, Media Bureau, FCC, to The Media Inst., at 5
(Dec. 8, 2010), available at http://commcns.org/1gNLW3c.
110 Id. at 4.
111 Id. at 6.
112 Comcast et al., Applications, supra note 12, at 4355–81.
113 Tramont, supra note 19, at 52.
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pute regarding the provision of programming.114 In addition, Comcast agreed to
honor NBC’s agreements to preserve network non-duplication to prevent importation of another affiliate’s broadcast station signal into an NBC affiliate’s
market.115 Comcast further agreed to refrain from using an NBC network direct
feed in any NBC affiliate’s market when an NBC affiliate withdraws retransmission consent in connection with retransmission negotiations between Comcast/NBC and the NBC affiliate.116 Comcast also agreed not to seek repeal of
the current retransmission consent regime.117
However, the FCC recognizes that its ability to reform the retransmission
consent process without Congressional action is limited.118 On March 3, 2011,
the FCC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with a goal “to protect
consumers from the disruptive impact of the loss of broadcast programming
carried on MVPD video services.”119 In this Notice, the Commission stated that
it does not believe that it has the authority to require interim carriage or mandatory binding dispute resolution procedures.120 Nevertheless, it asked for
comment on certain measures to reduce retransmission consent disputes, including:
[W]hether it should be a per se violation for a station to agree to give a network with
which it is affiliated the right to approve a retransmission consent agreement with an
MVPD or to comply with such an approval provision . . . we seek comment on whether it should be a per se violation for a station to grant another station or station group
the right to negotiate or the power to approve its retransmission consent agreement
when the stations are not commonly owned . . . whether it should be a per se violation
for a [broadcaster or MVPD] to refuse to put forth bona fide proposals on important
issues . . . whether it should be a per se violation for a [broadcaster or MVPD] to refuse to agree to non-binding mediation when the parties reach an impasse within 30
days of the expiration of their retransmission consent agreement . . . what it means to
“unreasonably” delay retransmission consent negotiations [to give more substance to
the reasonableness requirement in Section 76.65(b)(1)(iii)] . . . whether a broadcaster’s request or requirement, as a condition of retransmission consent, that an MVPD
not carry an out-of-market “significantly viewed” . . . station violates Section
76.65(b)(1)(vi) of [the Commission’s] rules.121

Another measure the FCC considered was whether the Commission should
provide more specificity in defining what would be a breach of good faith under the “totality of the circumstances” in § 76.65(b)(2) and, if so, how.122 An
additional measure the FCC contemplated was whether it should revise its
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Comcast et al., Applications, supra note 12, at 4358.
Id. at 4433.
Id. at 4308.
Id. at 4355–81.
See Time Warner et al., Petition, supra note 4, at 2743.
See id. at 2727.
See id. at 2727–28.
See id. at 2730–33.
See id. at 2734.
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rules requiring notice to consumers of programming blackouts.123 The FCC also
asked whether it should eliminate the network non-duplication and syndicated
exclusivity rules.124
Although these proposals would put some additional pressure on MVPDs
and broadcasters to come to agreements on retransmission consent, they are
unlikely to have a substantial effect because the Commission would not have
the authority to require binding arbitration or even interim carriage in the event
of an impasse.125 Eliminating the network non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity rules might sound as if it would give MVPDs greater leverage to bargain among broadcasters, but as the FCC recognized, these rules were originally derived from private contracts between broadcast networks and their affiliates.126 Thus, even if the FCC were to remove them, the parties could enforce
such agreements through litigation.127
Since the record was complete with respect to this NPRM, the Commission
itself has taken no formal steps to complete work in the docket.128 Nevertheless,
the industry continues to pressure the FCC.129 The latest arguments surround
the allegation that unaffiliated broadcasting entities are jointly engaged in retransmission consent negotiations, increasing the number of potential broadcast
stations subject to the negotiations and hence their market power.130 MVPDs
argue that such joint groupings should be outlawed because they unnecessarily
increase retransmission consent fees and, thus, harm consumers.131 These arguments are made unabashedly, even by multi-billion dollar MVPDs.132 Broadcasters, of course, claim that these negotiations are lawful, are pro-competitive,
and that there is no evidence that joint negotiations increase retransmission
consent fees.133 There is no doubt that the level of the rhetoric is soaring, although the public interest arguments for or against a particular proposal are not
improving.

See id. at 2738.
See id. at 2740.
125 See id. at 2727–29.
126 See id. at 2740–41.
127 Id.
128 Brill & Murchison, supra note 3.
129 See e.g., Letter from Mathew M. Brill, Counsel, Time Warner Cable, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Sec’y, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, MM Docket No. 10-71 (filed June 7, 2013); In re
Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Retransmission Consent, Supplemental
Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters, MM Docket No. 10-71 (filed May
29, 2013) [hereinafter Supplemental Comments of the NASB].
130 Letter from Mathew M. Brill, Counsel, Time Warner Cable, supra note 129, at 2.
131 Id. at 1.
132 Id.
133 Supplemental Comments of the NASB, supra note 129, at iii.
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RETRANSMISSION CONSENT IN A CHANGING
ENVIRONMENT

One can question whether multi-billion dollar cable TV companies actually
need any help in their negotiations with over-the-air broadcast stations, particularly those that have much lower capitalization than their larger competitors.
However, several newer competitors, such as those companies providing Internet-protocol Television (“IPTV”), argue that they are new entrants in local
markets trying to compete against their much more established cable TV competitors.134 These new entrants argue that they often lack negotiating power
with over-the-air broadcasters, because they do not yet have sufficient viewers
to motivate broadcasters to negotiate a reasonable price for carriage of their
broadcast programming.135 Given that increasing competition in the delivery of
video programming has long been a goal of both Congress136 and the FCC,137
the availability of programming, particularly “must see” programming that
arguably includes local TV broadcasts, might be a goal that policymakers
would like to advance. Given this market imbalance, it probably would be wise
to analyze separately the need for retransmission consent rules by these new
entrants from the interests of more established MVPDs, which may simply be
looking for legal leverage to help them gain lower programming prices. This is
help that they do not need.138
Without congressional modification of the laws governing retransmission
consent, it is likely that the current brinkmanship between broadcasters and
MVPDs will continue regardless of whether the FCC adopts its proposed
changes. Broadcast networks and MVPDs, who are, more and more frequently,
direct competitors in originating programming, are under increasing pressure
to enhance revenues. Networks are also putting pressure on their affiliates for
additional revenue and even percentages of retransmission consent fees.139 The
134 In re Amendment of the Commission’s Rule Related to Retransmission Consent,
Comments of CenturyLink, MM Docket No. 10-71, at 2–3 (May 27, 2011).
135 Id. at i.
136 47 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2006).
137 In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission’s Policies Relating to the
Provision of Cable Television Service, Report, 5 F.C.C.R. 4962, 4965–66 (1990).
138 The FCC has used the new entrant rationale to impose unique regulatory requirements in the past grounded in antitrust principles. See Inquiry Into The Employment Practices of Stations Licensed to the Charlotte, North Carolina Market, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, 474–75 (1980). The downside of new entrant regulation is
that it has often survived the usefulness or need for such limited regulation. The Computer
Inquiries—Then
and
Now,
FREE
STATE
FOUND.
(Nov.
9,
2009),
http://commcns.org/1fWoFy9.
139 See Fox Seeks a Share of Retransmission Fees, supra note 90, at B3; Fights Between
Programmers and Distributors Heat Up, supra note 93; Fox Clause Is Focal Point of Fight,
supra note 94.
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cost of programming, especially in the sports market, continues to rise.140 Consumers are able to get more programming for free on the Internet.141 These and
other factors will push broadcast affiliates and networks to demand greater
compensation from MVPDs, while impelling MVPDs, who face consumer
anger over rate increases, to resist. But all of these factors applicable to established market players militate against further congressional or regulatory action, which might well end up simply being government action that tips the
scales of the negotiations toward one type of player or the other. This type of
regulatory intervention is unwarranted either as a matter of antitrust principles,
or to promote competition in the programming environment.
Thus, Congress would be better off taking a step back and determining
whether the current legal structure makes sense given the vast changes that
have occurred in the video-programming market.142 In 1993, one year after the
1992 Cable Act was adopted, 40 percent of television households relied on
over-the-air television.143 By 2009, only 10 percent of households were still
140 Programming costs have mushroomed in the past several years. Meg James, Cost of
Cable TV Content Soars; Spending on Sports and Original Shows Has Shot up in the Last 5
Years, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, at B1 (commenting that “networks are beginning to feel
the pinch of dramatically higher programming costs”). A driving factor in these increasing
costs has been sports programming fees. Todd Spangler, Sports Rights Costs Are Swelling
Dramatically Enough to Raise Fears of Exploding the Pay-TV Biz, VARIETY MEDIA (Aug.
13, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://commcns.org/1i8bvRY (stating that sports entertainment is a
“high-demand content that viewers don’t DVR. And unlike other video entertainment, it’s
not available from Netflix or other Internet services,” and the “[s]ports fees paid by cable,
satellite and telco TV companies are on pace to increase 12% in 2013, to $17.2 billion, according to research firm SNL Kagan”).
141 G. Chambers Williams, III, Internet Video Invades Cable TV’s Turf As More People
‘Cut Cords’, TRIB. BUS. NEWS (Jan. 1, 2011), http://commcns.org/OUtLBu (“[P]roviders are
losing customers to the Internet as consumers find that free or low-cost video streaming can
give them the programming they want at a much lower price than many cable providers
charge.”); Lindsay Wise, More Media Consumers Are Cutting the Cable Cord,
MCCLATCHDC (Sept. 16, 2013), http://commcns.org/1fD2BKg (“[T]he number of households that choose [to cut the cord] is on the rise, from 2 million in 2007 to 5 million in 2013,
Nielsen’s data show.”).
142 Consumers want to be connected, and online video increasingly provides this connection. See Williams, supra note 141 (“The trend, analysts say, is being fueled by the popularity of online video . . . [in what the industry calls] ‘over the top’ viewing.”); Dan O’Shea,
SNL Kagan: Q3 Video Subscriber Net Loss Hits 119,000, CONNECTED PLANET ONLINE
(Nov. 18, 2010, 12:14 PM), http://commcns.org/1ksGsAr (“[R]apidly growing loss[es] . . .
[show that] the impact of over-the[-]top video can no longer be dismissed.”). In fact, recent
research indicates that average online viewing time is now nearly equal to traditional television viewing time. Maria Sciullo, I Want My E(verywhere)-TV!, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Aug.
11, 2013), http://commcns.org/1hHaGfn (“A recent report from eMarketer . . . concluded
that for the first time, U.S. adults are on the verge of spending more time using digital media
than watching traditional television on a set.”).
143 See In re Implementation of Section 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992; Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, First Report, 9 F.C.C.R. 7442, 7451–52 (Sept.
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doing so.144 Similarly, in 1993, almost all multichannel video subscribers were
cable customers.145 By the end of 2010, cable had a little over 60 percent of the
multichannel video market, with satellite providers at around 33 percent and
telecommunications companies at about 6.4 percent.146
Other market developments also point to the need for a complete reexamination of cable and broadcast regulation. Cable channels and broadcasters are
now direct competitors in programming.147 Cable networks produce their own
original programming, although not to nearly the same degree as the networks,148 and are starting to challenge network dominance.149 Cable providers
can rely on two revenue streams, subscriber fees and advertising, while broadcasters are dependent on advertising and to a lesser extent on retransmission
consent fees.150 Broadcast television is watched by almost 90 percent of consumers via an MVPD subscription in the same way as cable channels; however, broadcasters have substantially higher regulatory burdens, such restrictions
on indecency and requirements for children’s programming.151 In addition, the
availability of content over the Internet and on demand continues to increase.
Wireless providers are openly calling for the repurposing of television broadcast spectrum to meet the growing demand for wireless broadband services.152
Further, broadcasters face a new threat: Internet services that allow people to
watch broadcast television on their computers.153
28, 1994); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 190 (1997) (“Forty
percent of American households continue to rely on over-the-air signals for television programming.”).
144 See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Fourteenth Report, 27 F.C.C.R. 8610, 8701 (July 20, 2012)
[hereinafter Fourteenth Report].
145 See In re Implementation of Section 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, supra note 143, at 7540.
146 See Fourteenth Report, supra note 144, at 8612.
147 See Joe Flint, Cable Vs. Broadcast Isn’t a Fair Fight, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2009,
10:23 AM), http://commcns.org/1n3LZvN.
148 Id.
149 Gary Levin, In 2010, Cable TV’s Ratings Put Networks on Notice, USA TODAY (Dec.
24, 2010, 2:01 AM), http://commcns.org/1pX7mRX.
150 Cable Vs. Broadcast Isn’t a Fair Fight, supra note 147.
151 See Fourteenth Report, supra note 144, at 8630, 8690–91, 8694 (stating that 90 percent of households with televisions receive their broadcast stations from an MVPD; also
discussing the regulatory burdens imposed on broadcasters); Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity – FAQ, FCC.GOV, http://commcns.org/MJDuZn (last visited Sept. 21, 2013); FAQS Television and Cable, FCC.GOV, http://commcns.org/NOkU35 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
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153 For example, the New York Times recently reported:
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Over-the-air TV broadcasters themselves enjoy several regulatory advantages that seem anachronistic in today’s marketplace. Examples such as
syndicated exclusivity and network non-duplication rights are just two examples of these advantages.154 These unique advantages were created in order to
protect broadcasters from unfair cable TV competition, but they are no longer
necessary in today’s marketplace.155 Eliminating these special advantages on all
sides may level the playing field, create a more competitive retransmission
consent negotiation environment, and preclude further government regulation.156
This all points to more limited retransmission consent modifications aimed
solely at aiding new entrants in obtaining needed broadcast programming during the early stages of their entry into particular viewer markets. A regulation
that would guarantee access for a start-up period, such as for two years, would
go far in ending delay tactics that over-the-air broadcasters exhibited toward
new entrants.
Although regulators focus on viewing audience disruptions caused by retransmission consent-related blackouts, where there exists market competition
for programming, these types of disruptions will work themselves out fairly
quickly. Despite individual subscribers’ understandable anger that they cannot
view their favorite football game or the Academy Awards, these types of disruptions simply are not so serious that they warrant government intervention.
Consumers are increasingly capable of voting with their pocketbooks. If individual corporate actors anger enough consumers, they are not going to be in
business long, and these consumers will find their programming other ways,

computer or tablet into a small television set . . . . Aereo [is able] to avoid paying
the retransmission fees . . . for access to stations. . . . [B]roadcasters, including
CBS Corporation, Comcast, News Corporation and the Walt Disney Company,
filed two suits . . . before the service was made available in New York. But a district court judge denied the request for a preliminary injunction last summer.
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2013, at B3; see also Felix Salmon, Aereo and The Death of Broadcast TV, REUTERS (Apr.
22, 2013, 1:05 PM), http://commcns.org/1dV1iAP.
154 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92(a), 76.93, 76.101, 76.103 (2012).
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which often cuts the offending business out of the equation.157
Rather than considering the relative merits of MVPD arguments that broadcasters are price gouging and broadcaster arguments that they are only seeking
appropriate compensation for their programming, it is time to rethink the laws
and regulations governing cable and broadcast as a whole. The proposed revisions to retransmission consent rules will mitigate consumer blackouts in the
short term, but do nothing to address the fundamental changes in the video distribution industry.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The twin broadcast programming provisions of must carry and retransmission consent have served the purpose of ensuring that MVPDs are allowed to
carry local broadcast programming, while protecting broadcasters from unfair
competition. Over time, however, these provisions have failed to keep pace
with market realities. Broadcasters began to exact higher and higher payments
in exchange for permission to carry their local stations on MVPD systems.
Breakdown of negotiation over broadcast programming have often disrupted
consumers by creating blackouts at unpredictable periods of time.
Although the Commission is examining in an NPRM whether to change retransmission consent regulations, it is unclear whether it has the statutory authority to enact meaningful changes to retransmission consent law. Given the
rise in competition, however, it is unclear that any further regulation is justified, except perhaps to protect nascent MVPD competitors. In the meantime,
however, continued retransmission consent battles are likely to continue. More
fundamental video marketplace reform seems justified, and would likely address some of the negotiations imbalances that are the source of the retransmission consent battles.

157 Alternative access to other sources of programming is increasingly available, whether
in the form of You Tube, Netflix, Amazon, or other varied sources. Fourteenth Report, supra note 144, at 8724, 8734, 8739, 8744, 8751–52, 8756–58.

